In this article, I argue that thc.extensive damage in New Orleans and the trend in increasing numbers and severity of disasters arc the wholly predictable (in fact, predicted) outcomes of well-intentioned, but short-sighted, public poliCY decisions at all levels ofgovernment. These decisions cr~ate two paradoxes. One I term the safe development paradox, since I show that in hying to make hazardous urcas safe for development, government policies instead have made them targets for catastrophes. The second I term the local government paradox, since I show that while citizens bear the brunt of loss"es in disasters, local public officials often fail to take actions necessary to protect them. The consequences of each paradox reinforce the <;>thel' and in combination lead to a never ending cycle ofever more unsafe urban development and ever larger, ever more catastrophic losses from natural hazards.
The political considerations of the president and Congress that create the safe development paradox arc not likely to change. Federal assistance following disasters is likely to increase with increasingly severe disasters, as will federal efforts to make places at risk safer communities in which to live und work. \\lhat can change, I argue, is uninformed local government decision making about urban development that results in rnillions of households and businesses occupying at-risk structures in vulnerable locations. The vehicles for bringing this about are federal policies that (1) require local governments to prepare comprehensive plans tlmt give due consideration to natural hazards and (2) require local governments to assume greater financial responsibility for the consequences of their urban development decision making. Using data on National Flood Insurance Program (NFli» claims and payments in coastal counties over a twenty-fIve-year period, I show that comp rehensive planning requirements adopted by state governments already have resulted in lower per capita losses from flooding. But less than half of the states require local governments to prepare plans, and fewer than ten states require that plans pay attention to natural hazards. "
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The wake of Hurricane Kahina provides an opportunity for the federal government to use the public concern created by the disaster to spur more local governments to prepare comprehensive plans that address hazard mitigation. In addition, if the govenlment reOlients the NFIP so that more of the burden of responsibility for insurance coverage is borne by local governments, local officials may becorne more committed to limiting development in hazardous areas and to mitigating the hazard to existing development at risk (see Burby and May 1998) . This article points out several ways the government can accomplish these ends and in doing so erase yet another paradox, noted by Platt (1999, xvii) , "On the one hanel, the federal government is called upon to assume a major share of state, local and private economic costs of disasters.... But on the other hand, the government at all levels is increasingly impotent to demand ... that local governments and individuals assume the political and financial burdens of curtailing uIl\\~se development in haz.'lrdous locations."
The mticle is organized as follows. In the next two sections, I describe the two paradoxes and illustrate them with evidence frorn policy choices made by federal, state, and local agencies in the New Orleans urea over the decades prior to Hurricane Katrina. Next I examine state requirements for local government planning and building code enforcement as a means of dealing with the adverse consequences of the paradoxes and present empirical evidence on their effects in reducing disaster losses. The article concludes \\~th a brief look at various ways the federal government can increase local government commitment to reducing vulnerability to hazards by (1) requiring that they prepare comprehensive plans \\~th hazard mitigation elements and (2) requiring that they assll Ine more responsib ility for insuring private and public property at risk from hazards.
Safe Development Paraclox
For most of this cenhll)', the federal government has pursued a policy toward the use ofhazardous areas that I term safe development. The basic idea is that land exposed to natural hazards can be profitably used ir steps are taken to make it sare for human occupancy. The means of achie\~ng this have evolved over time, but they basically include measures to mitigate the likelihood~fdamage and measures to deal with residual finnnciall'isk (sec Platt 1999; King 200,5) . To minimize damage, they include rederal financial support ror Oood aud hurricane protection works and beach nourishment, federal requirements through the NFIP for safe building practices such as elevation ofconstruction in flood haz.'lrcl areas, and federal incentives for local government mitigation efforts through prO\~sions "Df the Disaster Mitigation Act or 2000 and National Flood Insurance neroI'm Acts of 1994 and 2004. To minimize the adverse financial consequences for individuals Ulul businesses when steps to make development safe from haz.'l.rds fail (known technically as residual risk), the federal government has provided generous disaster relief, particularly for homeowners, low-cost loans to ease business recoveI)', income tax deductions for uninsured disaster losses, and subsidized flood insur-anee. The costs ofthese policies to the federal government were estimated conservatively by Conrad, McNitt, and Stout (1998, 5) Lewis (2003, 76) , "the metropolitan area ... simplye'1'loded into the swamps-first toward the East Bank section of Jefferson Pmish; more recently, into the eastern reaches of Orleans Pmish and beyond." He went on to note that "most of the newly developed land is built on muck and is sinking at various rates. Mueh of the land is subject to e'tremely dangerous nooding" (I" 77). Although Huniemle Betsy revealed the potential for \\tdespread nooding of the low-I)tng areas of both parishes, the construction of improved hunicane protection works and availability of flood insurance evidently persuaded thousands of households that the region was reasonably safe. The development ofthe area east ofthe Industrial Canal, which contains 50 percent of the land area in the City of New Orleans, is a case in point. In 1960, before the new levee plan, eastern New Orleans consisted mostly of wetlands ,,~th a few scattered highway commercial acth~ties and subdivisions along Downmml Road and the CbefMenteur Highway(U.S. 90), whieh linked New Orleans to the Mississippi Gulf Coast. With the pending construction of the 1-10 1\vin Span aeross the east end of Lake Pontchartrain and extension of the interstate through the heart of the area and the decision to extend the city's hurricane protection levee system to the east, the New Orleans City Planning Commission ndopted a plan in 1966 calling fol' intensive urban developrnent in what later became known as Planning Distriel 9. The New Cen/u ry New Orlealls Plall noted, Full scale development ensued, ., and concurrent expenditures for streets, parks, schools, and sewerage and drainage was the largest single factor to change the land use/>fofile., . as well as make the area a significant growth area for the future development 0 the t\letro-polHan area. , . the area continued to grow from 1975 to 1985, New subdivisions were developed at a rapid pace. , . (and) major commercial cenll:;rs developed and prospered. (City Planning Commission 1999, 188) Further to the east in Planning District 10, the 1970s saw the development of NASA's 830-aere Michoud roeket assembly facility, whieh is a major employer in the region, and an attempt to build a major new community (Pontchartrain New Town-In Town Plan) with support from the federal new communities program. \"hcn the federal program was shut clown in 1975, 'these projects, renamed Orlandia and New Orleans East, proceeded as wholly private ventures that hoped to provide housing for an estimated 250,000 residents. Even though the pace of development slowed after 1985, between 1970 and 2000 this area of former marshes and swamps saw more than 22,000 new hOllsing units built and the city wanted more. In its 1999 New Celli/lry New Orlealls Lalld Use Plall, the city planning comrnission argued, r-,·Ioreover, there are extensive opportunities for future development of the vacant parcels that range from single vftcanllots to multi-thousand acre tracts. Long tcrm, these development opportunities represent not oul)' population increases but also significant potential emplo)'lllcnt for the cHy. (Cily Planning Commission, 1999, 201) Ironicall)', just six )'ears later, the entire area of urban growth the city had been prom oting and the COlVS protecting 1'01' forty years was entirel)' under water.
As the e'1JeIienee of New Orleans illust""tes, fede",,1 polie)' has had its lllfcmded effect offacilitating and sustaining development in hazardous areas. The paradox is that in tr),ing to make the most hazardous parts of New Orleans safe for urban e'1',msion, it had the /l1I11l1li/illed effect ofcoutributing directl), to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. It did that by increasing theamount ofdevelopment possible in low-l),ing, flood-prone arcas such as NewOrieans East; and, some contend, by providing levee protection and new drainage works to that area of suburban growth, the COIIJS and city diverted resources that could have been used to improve drainage, pumpingcapacit)', and levees in oldel' areas ofthe city (see Drew 1984, 1, 10) .
Supposedl)' safe development in New Orleans {and elsewhere} has proven to be unsafe for several reasons including limitations of flood and hurricane protection works and limitations of the NFIP's efforts to control losses throngh floodplain mapping and regulation of construction practices. Flood control and hurricane protection measures have serious limitations, most ofwhich are not recognized by households and businesses who put themselves at risk b), locating in potentially hazardous arcas. These limitations include (1) design limits that can lead to levees being overtopped b), flood and hurricane events that are larger than they were designed for and {2} design flaws and construction and maintenance shortcomings that lead to protective works being breached when the)' cannot stand up to the forces exerted by large flood and hurricane events. Both apparentl)' contributed to the levee failures along three New Orleans canals that flooded the city (Cartel' 200.5). This occurrence is not unique inasmuch as FEMA estimated in 1987 that levee overtopping or failure was involved in approximately one-third of all flood disasters. Concern about them is also not recent. Noted geographer Gilbert White observed in 1975 that flood control works "\\111 be of little value if the reduction in damages that they accomplish is more than offset b), new damage potential resulting from additional development in floodplains" (p. xviii). This potential \yas demonstrated b), Burby and French (1985) , who studied more than twelve hundred communities with flood hazards and found a positive correlation between the degree to which communitics used flood control works to lirnit their vulnerability to flooding and the amount of Hew development taking placc in their flood hazard areas "fter the flood control works were completed.
The NFIP tries to limit flood losses by imposing construction standarcls that reduce thc likelihood of newly constructed buildings being flooded. These stan· darcls, which must be adopted and enforced by local governments as a cOllclilion for participation in the program, include elevation or flood proofing to the level of floods with a one in one hundred chance of occurring'in any given year. For a variety of reasons, that level ofprotection is not achieved in some cases and cven when achieved may not be adequate (see Burby [2002] for a fuller elaboration of these issues). For one, accurate estimation of flood risk is a critical ingredient in regulating the elevation of new development, but the program has had difficulty doing that because it has been unable to update in a timely manner flood insuran<;e rate maps to take into account increased flood risk from sca-Ievel lise, subsidence, coastal erosion, or increased runoff as watersheds develop in urban areas. Flood insurance is available, but bUildings 'are not required to he elevated in arcas at risk from dam and levee failure, in areas with localized storm water drainage flooding, or in small watersheds of less than one square rnile. As a consequence of these problems, the NFIP has regularly not been ablc to co\/er its costs from premiurns and has had to borrow from the'n·easlll)'. According to Pasterick (1998) , operating losses occurred annually betwcen 1972 and 1980 and in the years 1983, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996 . An operating loss also occurred in 2004, and with more than $22 billion in e;..vected claims from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and \Vilma in 2005, the program will require an infusion of money from the TreasUl)' that it will not be able to repay from future premium income (Crenshaw200.5 j AS).
To the degree the program f.,ils to adequately reflect Iisk in rates and uperates Ht a loss, it subsidizes the occupancy of hazardous areas and facilitates more development than is economically rational.
Furthermore, the basic standard of protection used by the NFIP~the onehundred-year flood event~ma)' be ill-advised, since most flood losses in the United States stcm from less frequent flood events. One carly study reported that fi6 percent of losses in floods come from events with recurrence intervals less frequent than the one·hundred.year flood (Sheaffer et al. 1976 ). Another stud), repOlted that 83 percent of losses from hurricane winds and flooding come from CategOl)' 3, 4, and 5 storms, which have recurrence intervals lowcl' than the onehundred,),ear event (Pielke and Landsca 1997) In addition to limitations in its llbilit)' to limit losses to new development, by subsidizing rates for existing development, the prograrn provides little incentive for propcltyowners to take steps on their own to reduce flood vulnerability. I-Iollseh old surveys by BtII'by et aJ. (1988) and Laska (1991) found that less than 15 percent of property owners took action to improve their bUildings prior to experiencing flood losses. There are a variety of reasons, in addition to subsidized flood insurance, for this inaction, including rnisperception and underestimation of the risk of flooding, inability to recover investments in mitigation investments through higher resale values, budget constraints, and expectations that federal disaster reliefwill cover losses. For the NFIp, theconsequcnces have been dil'esince repetitively flooded properties (which account for about 2 percent of all NFIP policics) aCCOlilit for morc than 25 percent ,ofclaims payments made (sec Anderson 2000).
In summmy, federal policies have sought to make areas at risk from natural hazards safe places for urban development by reducing thc degree of hazard and by shielding hazard~area occupants from financial risks of loss. Over time, these policies have facilitated the development of these areas; as illustrated byurban growth in New Orleans, but they have increased the potential for catastrophic losses in large disasters. In this sense, Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans could be viewed as an exvected consequence of federal policy rather than an aberration that is unlikely to be repeated.
Local Government Paradox Milcti (1999, 66) scrutinizcd the $500 billion in losses from natural disasters in the United States between 1975 and 1994. He found that a relatively small proportion was covered by federal disaster relief, and that most losses were not insured. Instead, "losses were borne by victims." Given that the incidence ofdisaster losses is primarily borne by local residents and businesses, one would expect that avoidance oflosses would be a high priority for local officials. The paradox is tbatthis is t)1'ically not the case.
Prior to being coerced into adopting floodplain management regulations by the National Flood Insurance Act in 1968, virtually no local governments in th.e United States had adopted building or zoning regulations to minimize flood losses (e.g., see Murphy 1958) . Although thousands ofgoveruments subsequently adopted the minimum building standards needed to participate, man)' did not enforce them seliousl)' or take other actions to deal with flood and hurricane risks. In South Carolina, for example, building code violations were found to be an important There are many reasons for the lo~al govern;nent paradox. In his national assessmentor natural haznrds in the United States, Mileti (1999,160) touched on several of them.
Few local govcl1llllcnts arc willing to reduce llatural haznrds by managing development. It is not so much that thcyoppose land use measures (althou"gh some do), but rather thal,like Individuals, theylcnd to view natural hazards as a minor prohlem that cun take a back seat to more pressing local concems such us unemployment, clime, housing, and edt~cation. Also, the cos!s of mlligalion are immediate while the benefits arc IIncclinin. may nat occur <lUling the tenure of cunent elected officials, and arc nol visible (like roads or a new libra,)').
May(1991) noted that these local political factors stem in part from the lack ofcitizen concern about hazards) which he believes crea~es a "policies without publics" dilcmrna that stifles local polic)' initiatives. In addition, other scholars believe federal encouragement of the intensive use of areas exposed to natural haz..'uds has created a form of "moral hazard" that discourages local governments (and individuals) from taking actions to reduce the lisk of loss.
lvloral hazard is an insurance term that refers to cases where the availability of insurance protection lowers an insured patty's incentive to avoid risk. Insurance companies try to counter this through the use ofdeductibles and the threat ofcanceling policies if c1ahns are too frequent. The potential for moral hazard in the federal approach to natural hazards was nrst noted b), the Interagenc)' li'loodplain Management Heview Committee (1994, 180) following disastrous lIoorls in the upper Midwest in 1993. In cornmentillg on the potential for federal programs to create a form of moral haz..'lrd, the committee observed, "Through provisioil of disaster assistance and, in sOllle cases, enhanced Ooml protection, the government may in fact be reducing incentives for local governments and individuals to be more prudent in their actions." Also written in 1994, the House Bipartisan Natural Disasters Task Force stated, "If state and local governments believe that the federal government will meet their needs in evel)' disaster, they have less incentive to spend scarce state and local resources on disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovCl)' ... (and) people are encouraged to take risks they think they will not have to pay for" (quoted in Platt 1999,39) . li'inally, Mileti (1999, 7) has argued that a "scattershot approach, as well as the federal and state trend to cut risk and assume liability, has undermined the responsibility of local govenlments for using land-use management techniques to reduce exposures to hazards.",i B)' the 1990s, various federal programs were being adjusted to rleal with the lnoral hazard issue. The Stafford Act in 1988 and more recent Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 both provide federal assistance for the preparation of state and local hazard mitigation plans and implementation of hazard mitigation projects. Although the Stafford Act has been found to be ineffective in man)' cases (see Godschalk et al. 1998 ), some of the problems identified ma)' be countered b), the more recent Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 legislation. A similar effort has been made to counter the potential of the NFIP to foster local complacency toward flood hazards. The Flood Insurance Refotm Act of 1994 established incentives for the preparation of Ooodplain management plans and other flood mitigat,ion measures, and the Flood Insurance Herorm Act of2004 provided tools for dealing\\~th repeatedly flooded properties. However, the degree to which any of these efforts have had an effed on local governrnent commitment to dealing \\~th hazards is not known at this time.
Avoiding the Two Paradoxes
The paradoxes that contributed to the flooding of New Orleans are coming to be widel)' recognized. An October 200.5 anal),sis b), the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Program noted, l"edeml policies and investments in flood protection facilitated development in dangerous localions ... and failed to discourage floodplain development. . , , [Tlhe traditional federal deference to state and local land-use planning has meant that federal spending on levees ,mel other protections hilS been ull<lccompanied by sensible reslJiclions on subsequent construction, . , ,At the same time, the availability ofsubsidized federal flood insurance for new development in flood plains, , . also represents a failure onVashington to take the lead in discouraging communities from building in harm's way. It seems obvious that unless the two paradoxes discussed here are addressed directl)' in fedeml polic)'. the devastation brought about by Katrina will be repeated continually across the United States.
I-laving noted this, it seems to me unlikely that the pork barrel polities that sustain federal investments in flood and hurricane protection, federal disaster relief, and federal insurance subsidies are likely to change evt-m though policy analysts increasingly recognize their adverse effects. \Vhat can change is how local governments manage the development and redevelopment of areas at risk. A series of studies supported by the National Science Foundation has shown that through appropriate land-use planning and oversight of development, risk and damages from hazards can be significantly reduced (see Burby, French, and Nelson'19g8; Olshansky 2001; Nelson and French 2002 ; Burb)' 200.5):' The difficulty. given the 10CHI government paradox, is how to bring this about.
One Hpproach state governments have llsed is to formulate state building codes and planning policies and to mandate that local governments enforce the codes and prepare comprehensive plans that are consistent ,with the policies. To determine whether these state requirements are having an effect on loss reduction, I examined the distribution of flood insurance claims and amount of claims payments made by the NFIP in coastal counties ofthe Atlantic, Gulf, and Paci fiestates over the twenly-five-year period from JanuHlY 1, 1978, through December 31, 2002. These states differed sigllil'icantl)' in their requirements regarding local enforcement of building codes and local planning for urban developrnent und redevelopment, us shown in Table 1 . Six coastal states, including each of those hit by Katrina, required neither local code enforcement nor IOCHI comprehensive plans, Eight slates required local governments to enforce codes or to develop plans, but not.both; and ten states required both 10CHI code enforcement and local formulation and adoption of comprehensive plans. Most of the states that required both code enforcmnent ruld planning also required that plans address natural'hazards. The number of NFIP insurance claims per capita for compensation of flood damages and the per capita dollar amollnt of payments made to settle claims were highest in states that did not require responsible beha\~or-neither building cocle enforcement nor comprehensive plans-from their local governments. They were lowest in states that reqUired one or hoth from their local governments, as shown in Table 2 . The three states hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina left decisions about code enforcement and planning for urban development and redevelopment wholly to local discretion. The consequences for them and the nation have been calamitous. Among all coastal counties, the NFIP m"1)erienced thirteen flood-loss claims per thousand residents between 1978 and 2002. In Louisiana, the rate was fifty-five claims per thousand residents ofcoastal counties, while it was thirty-one and thirtytwain Alabama and Mississippi, respectively. Dollar losses pCI' capita were $133 among all coastal counties. Theywere $530 pel' capita in Louisiana, $337 percapita in Alabama, and $277 per capita in Mississippi. The statistical association between state requirelnents for the preparation of local comprehensive plans and lower per capita NFlI' claims and payments continues when adjustments are made for~l number ofother factors that affect the like~i hood of suffering flood damages, including the number of severe weather events expetiencecl over the twenty-five-yearperiod, population size und density, population growth, and the value of homes at risk:') However, when these other factors arc statistically controlled in multivariute analyses, the imfmct of plunning mandates is lower (a reduction in losses ofabout 1 percent) and the existence ofa building code enforcement mandate is no longer statistically significant. These results are shown in the appendix, Also revealing is a comparison of Florida and Texas, two states that escaped damage from Hurricane Katrina but arc similar in other ways in terms of coastal urbanization and storm history. Texas has chosen to leave decisions about building corle enforcement and planning wholly to the discretion of local governments. 
Sharing the Burden
In this article, I have argued that two paradoxes help explain the devastation caused by Hurrieane Katrina in New Orleans and can be expected to contribute to similar disasters in the future. The safe development paradox occurs when federal efforts to make inherently hazardous areas safe fol' development in fact make them highly susceptible to disasters of catastrophic proportions. In New Orleans, these federal efforts consisted primarily of funding hUi"ricanc protection levees and other flood control works to promote urban development in the "protected" areas and the provision of flood insurance at subsidized rates. The local govertllllcnl lmradox occurs when local governments, whose citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss when dis~sters occur, give insufficient attention to threats posed by hazards when they allow the intensive development of hazardous areas.
In New Orleans, this paradox is illustrated by the city's facilitation of development in eastern New Orleans and hy the Orleans Parish Levee Board's unwillingness to help underwrite the costs of higher levels of flood and hurricane protection.
The two paradoxes help account for the upward spiral in the frequency and magnitude of natural disasters. If this trend is to be slowed or reversed, I believe it will be necessaty for local governments to share more of the burden of disasters through careful planning and management ofdevelopment in hazurdolls areas and by assuming more of the financial responsibility for development at risk. I have shown that where states have required local governments to prepare und implement comprehensive plans for urban development, losses from flooding arc lower than they are when states leave these matters solely to local governments' discrel ion. State requirements for building code enforcement also may have some effect, although it could not be confirmed in multivariate analyses. Not sUlvrisingly, the states ofAlabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi have been noteworthy for their rehlct ance to interfere in localland~use and development decision maldng. In contrast, equally Oood-and hurricane-prone Florida has demanded local action, and as a result per capita Ooocllosses over twenty-five years have been much lower there.
There arc two relatively easy-to-accomplish steps the federal government could take to encournge local governrnents to prepare comprehensive plans. First, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 could be amended to require that regular mitigation plan updates mandated by the legislation be integrnted into local cornprehensive plans, where they exist. \-Vjthout this step, the mitigation plans are likely to be ignored in local government decision making because ofthe lack ofcommitment to hazard mitigation activities noted earlier. Many states require that local government land-use and infrastructure decisions be consistent with comprehensive plans. Thus, by incOll)orating mitigation plans into comprehensive plans, the mitigation plans to some e;'\tent would be self-enforcing in the sense that local officials would have to pay attention to them as they make decisions about public investments and developnlent permits. In addition, this would provide a stimulus to broaden the scope of mitigation plans beyond narrow safe development and emergency management considerations.
Second, the Flood Insurance Act could be amended to add the preparation of local comprehensive plans with hazard mitigation provisions as a condition for contintled participation in the program. At present,participation in the program is conditioned on local governments' agreement to adopt and enforce building regul ations to reduce the likelihood of flood damage. Previous research has shown that local governments with plans are more likely than those without plans to use landuse regulations, in addition to the b"uilding regulations, to reduce vulnerability to nooding (Burby and Dalton 1994) . Financial assistance could be provided to the states to encourage them to facilitate this through parallel state legislation and to also provide technical assistance to localities.
The major change in approach I have in mind would, . , shift the program from insuring individuals and businesses for flood losses /:0 insuring communities.
The two policy changes suggested above would be beneficial, but given the lack of concern for hazard mitigation revealed by the local government paradox, I believe a sea change in government policy is likely to be needed before the trend in increasing disaster losses can be halted. The major change in approach I have in mind would involve amendment of the Flood Insurance Act to shift the program from insuring individuals and businesses for nood losses to insming communities (aud all of their dwellings and commerciaVgovernmental buildiugs). With this new approach, flood insurance coverage and premiums would be ba'ied on the degree. of exposure to loss in jurisdictions (i.e., the aggregate of the current number of dwellings aud other bnildings located within the five-hundred-year noodplain and other areas at risk of flooding localities wished to insure plus somc set coveragc for personal properly). Local governments could paytlte prernimns from general fund revenues, raising tax revenue from all citizens or businesses, but, most likely, tltey would set up special assessment districts or storm water/flood insurance ulilities to raise the required funds from properties that benefit from thc flood insurance coverage. Storm water utilitics are being used increasingly by localities to fund storm water managemcnt activities required by the U.S.. Environmental Protection Agency to curb nonpoint source pollution. In cases where local governments refuse to participate. which might be the casc when they have few properties·at risk or cannot raise the revenUe needed to pay flood insurance premiums, state governments could take responsibility for acquiring needed insurance and requiring that both local governments and properly owners take steps to reduce their risk of flood loss.
This revoilltionar)' change to the flood insurance program might have a Humber' of beneDts:
1. If a community chose to participate in the progwm, all of its Hood-prone dwellings and businesses would be covered, which would avoid the problem of a high. proportion of properties without insllmnc'e as has been the case in many flood disasters. Forcommuuities with any degree offlood risk, there would ob\1ously be tremendous political pressure to participate in the program. 2. Incentives for community participation, such as the withholding ofdisaster relicfbenefits for the amount oflosses that would havo been paid by nood insurance if the community were participaling in the program, could be crealed and, \vith adequate political will, enforced. 3. The cost of insurance coverage could create incentives [or state and local governments to reduce the lisk of 1100d loss and the size of the insurance premiums they pay. They also might think morecarefullyubollt plans fordevelo\)ment and redevelopment ofl1ood hazard areas and he less willing lo approve new deve opment in these areas. If communities use some version of a storm waler utility to fund insurance premiums, there would be a direcllink between nood insurance and local land use and water resources management, 4. The change [rom an individual-to a community-based program would also make it possible [or the NFIP (or pJivate insurailce companies) to more precisely align premium amounts with Iiskalld allow the creation ofstronger incentives for Iisk reduclion. It could encourage local governments to take sleps to reduce Iisk through relrofit or relocation of properties mosl at risk of noodlng. In addition, it might be possihle to begin illSUling infrastmcture at lisk in nood haz..·ud areas, as called for by Platt (1999, 291) 
Concluding Note
Obviously, before they could be seriously considered, the policy initiatives suggested here would require additional examination of the procedural changes that would be needed to bring them about and in-depth analysis of their benefits and costs and potential for unintended consequences. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for thinking them worth that effort. The policies proposed arc cooperative in nature. They are deSigned to increase local government commitment to hazard mitigation primarily through the creation of new, more powerful incentives. The increased government costs in the short nm would be counterbalanced by improved financial security for both citizens and local governments. As local officials take steps to improve safety from hazards, costs would decline over time. In addition, federal financial assistance to meet insurance costs could be provided to particularly poor communities, so that budgetmy considerations do not preclude them from insuring their residents. By providing a means to extend nood insurance to oUlocal residents and businesses at risk, the suggested policies promise to speed recovelywhen disasters occur. By strengthening incentives for states and localities to do what they should already be doing on their own initiative-paying systematic attention through existing local planning mechanisms to finding ways to reduce IUl7-<'uds vulnerability-they promise to halt and possibly reverse the trend in increasingly seliolls natural catastrophes. •p < .05. "p < .01. ".p < .001 (one-tailed test).
1. This estimate was derived from calculations of the average annual costs of federal disaster preparedness, response, rccovery/reconstn1ction, and mitigation progmllls of the follO\\ing federal departments and ngendes: Agriculture, Commerce, Corps of Engineers, Education, FEMA, Interior,nnd Transportation. It does not ludude costs bome by state and local governments or private Individuals and businesses.
2, Subsequent to anthoriznlion ofthe Lnke Pontchartrain project, Congress authOIi7.ed the Corps to ('011-stmct four mldilion1l1 hUrrienne proJcction projects, Induding one to add to llnd strengthen levees protecUng the west bank scctions of Jefferson and Orle,UlS parishes (Cnrter 2005), However, the Lake Pontchulirain Hunicane Protection Project fell behind its construclloll schedule, in part because by the 1980s costs of the proJec·t had escalated more than 1,000 percent. In addition, according to Grunwald and Classer (20O,S, 5), "Lo('al ofl1clals resisted the goal of Category 3 protection for their COllullunities as overly extravagant. In 1982, the Orleans Levee District urged the Corps to 'lower lis design standards to prOVide more real!~tlchur-ricane protection' and argued that loo-year protection would be fine," 3, The potential for moral hazard to undercut local ofl1dals'lllterestln haz.'lrd miligatioll is based prilllarl1yoll anecdotes and the opinions ofvarious disaster experts. I am llnaware ofanys)'stematicempirical studies that have demonstrated a link between the prmision ofdisaster reliefand lliower degree oflocal government hllZArd mltigationactivilies, In f.'lct, Burbyel aI. (1091, 109) studied the effectsoflomlgovemmcnl rc('elpt of ptlblic assistance funds foJlo\\ing dlsaslers and found that governments that had received federal disaster aid were Ulore, rather than less, Iikel)'to take steps to mitigate nood ha1~'lrds in colllparlsonwith governments that had nol re<'elved federal disasterassislaJlC'c. The)' fouud no effed eitherwayon local govcnllllent attention to earthquake hazards, 4. The e:-,:peclalion that plans \\ill eonlribute to a reduction In \'ulnembililyto natuml hazards Is bttsed on eight considerations: (1) plans prmide a s)'stematlc way to gilther faels about haz.'lrd.~and increase public awarcness of them; (2) phn... prO\ide a way 10 systematic.ul), examine the adcquac)'of existing haz..'lrd mitigation mca-~ures being used: (3) plans enable citizens and loc,'ll offidnls 10 ereale a vision ofhltzard resilience and formulate specific policy goals and objectives; (4) plaJls help to develop consensus about the need to take acllon to reduce vulnerabilIty and to find courses of action that are polilicallyacceptable; (5) plans improve the likelihood that cOllullunllies,\illillvestlgate and lise (t va!iet)'ofapproaches to hazard milig,ltlon; (0) plans provide guidance 10 the day-to-(l'lydcdslons ofloe''ll offiehls in ''lpprovlllg or dlsapprO\ing development proposals; (7) plans help coordinate the aclions ofvarious loeal govenlment departmenls that aflcct vulnerabilIt)'; and (8) plaJ1S pro\ide the rational nexus between the public interest and governmental aetions that is CJiti· cal in defending them againstlegnl athl('k For further elaboration of these benefits of plaJlIling. see Burby (2005) .
5. Similnr findings (0 these have been reported b), Burby (2OOS) for the impacts of stOlte plaJllling nlltl1-dates In redUcing plivate propert)' insuraJlce daims, Also, May and Birkland (199, 1) and May and Feeley (2000) 
